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Abstract 
By leaving the EU, the UK will also leave EU agencies such as Europol and 
Eurojust. Brexit, therefore, may create a gap in cooperation between law 
enforcement authorities of different Member States in their ability to detect 
human trafficking.  Legal instruments such as the European Arrest Warrant may 
be repealed and the UK may reduce their cooperation in EU criminal matters. 
While the UK remains in the EU, it can join EU legal measures in the criminal 
area.  After Brexit, this option will no longer be available. There is thus the risk 
that the UK will decide not to be bound by the Human Trafficking Directive. This 
article seeks to explore where the UK stands in the fight against human 
trafficking and what position it may adopt after Brexit. Subsequently, the article 
explicates the claim that a larger number of vulnerable people may be targeted 
by criminal organisations and recruited for the purpose of human trafficking and 
forced labour because EU citizens may no longer be entitled to live in the UK 
with the same rights and entitlements. This analysis will be conducted by 
examining EU legislation in the criminal area, UK legislation on human 
trafficking and the proposals presented by the UK government. 
Keywords: EU and UK criminal area, human trafficking, vulnerable 
migrants, EU citizens. 
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BREXİT VE İNSAN TİCARETİNE KARŞI MÜCADELE:  
MEVCUT DURUM VE GELECEKTEKİ BELİRSİZLİK 
 
Öz 
Birleşik Krallık (BK) Avrupa Birliği’nden (AB) ayrıldığında, Europol ve 
Eurojust gibi AB ajanslarından da ayrılmış olacaktır. Brexit, bu nedenle, farklı 
AB üyesi ülkelerin kanun yürütücü otoriteleri arasında insan ticaretini tespit 
etme yetenekleriyle ilgili işbirliğinde bir uçurum yaratabilecektir. Avrupa 
Tutuklama Emri/(Müzekkeresi) gibi yasal araçlar iptal edilebilecek ve BK’nın 
AB ile cezai alanlardaki işbirliği azalabilecektir. BK AB içindeyken, cezai 
alandaki AB yasal tedbirlerine katılmayı seçebilmektedir. Brexit sonrasında, bu 
seçenek  mevcut olmayacaktır. Bu yüzden de BK’nın İnsan Ticareti Yönergesi’ne 
bağlı olmamaya karar verme riski vardır. Bu makale, BK’nın insan ticaretine 
karşı mücadelede nerede durduğunu ve Brexit sonrasında nasıl bir tutum 
takınacağını inceleyecektir. Müteakiben, makale Brexit sonrasında AB 
vatandaşları BK’da aynı haklara sahip olamayacağından, insan ticareti ve zorla 
çalıştırma amaçlarıyla suç örgütlerinin hedefinde yer alabileceği için zarar 
görebilir kişilerin artacağını iddia etmektedir. Bu inceleme, AB’nin cezai 
alandaki müktesebatını ve BK’nın insan ticareti hakkındaki mevzuatını ve BK 
hükümeti tarafından ileri sürülen önerileri sorgulayarak yapılacaktır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: AB ve BK cezai alanı, insan ticareti, zarar 
görebilir/savunmasız göçmenler, AB vatandaşları. 
 
Introduction 
The UK’s departure from the EU is causing considerable concerns in how to 
address human trafficking.  This is because the UK will re-consider their position 
in the fight against human trafficking along with the EU, the use of the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW) and the access to Europol and Eurojust to detect criminals 
and suspected criminals perpetrating this crime at trans-national level.  Human 
trafficking is a very widespread crime in the EU and in the UK. Causes of human 
trafficking are vulnerability due to poverty, conflicts, marginalisation, social 
exclusion, discriminations against women and children (European Commission, 
2018). It has been estimated that criminal groups “take advantage of 
discrepancies in labour law to organise the exploitation of victims in the grey 
zone between legal employment and labour exploitation” (European Union, 
2017). Brexit may have serious consequences in the fight against human 
trafficking as EU citizens will not be protected by EU law on free movement of 
workers anymore because they will be required to provide a visa in order to enter 
the UK for working. Strict controls over immigration can cause an increase of 
human trafficking as it has been reported that criminal organisations target non-
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EU vulnerable migrants by threatening them to confiscate their passport and by 
other forms of coercion.  EU citizens are less vulnerable as they are not subject 
to strict immigration controls as they can move freely from one Member State to 
another.  However, the UK’s departure from the EU can change the situation as 
the UK can make strict controls over EU citizens who consequently, will be more 
vulnerable and more exposed to exploitation. 
In the criminal area, there is at least one certainty: The UK aims to continue 
to co-operate with the EU in fighting trans-national crimes. From this point of 
view, it seems that “the future of the EU/UK relationship on security will not be 
vastly different from the present” (Peers, 2017). Certainly, the UK has clearly 
stated that they do not want to be bound by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) jurisdiction after their departure from the EU. Consequently, it 
must be evaluated how the UK intends to continue to co-operate with the EU in 
the fight against trans-national crime. 
Concerns have also been expressed in relation to the new status of EU citizens 
because, after a specified date, they will no longer be free to move to the UK 
without immigration controls. This means that EU citizens will be required to 
register their arrival in the UK. There is the risk that many of them will not 
register their arrival as they may not be entitled to remain in the UK. 
Consequently, these people will become vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers. 
There is uncertainty concerning the status of EU citizens whilst the negotiations 
are being discussed.    
This article will examine EU trafficking legislation and the actual UK’s 
position towards this legislation. Subsequently, it will focus on how Brexit may 
affect the fight against human trafficking and co-operation between Member 
States where the crime is perpetrated. Finally, the article will also focus on the 
consequences that Brexit may have on the free movement of EU citizens and on 
how proposed changes may affect EU citizens and their risk of becoming victims 
of human trafficking.  
EU Trafficking Directive  
Human Trafficking is regulated by Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, 
adopted in 2002 and by Directive 2011/36/EU (from now on Trafficking 
Directive), which has replaced the previous Framework Decision.  
This directive not only describes the crime but also establishes a 
comprehensive programme for the protection of human trafficking victims 
(Directive 2011/36/EU: Articles 1 and 11-16). The Directive is more specific in 
the definition of trafficking and in providing protection, compared to the previous 
Framework Decision. It defines the “position of vulnerability as a situation in 
which the person concerned has no real or acceptable alternative but to submit to 
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the abuse involved” (Article 2 Para 2 Directive 2011/36/EU 5 April 2011). The 
Trafficking Directive also recalls two very important legal sources which are 
Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA and Directive 2004/81/EC (Residence 
Permit Directive). Paragraph 17 of the Trafficking Directive reveals the 
difference from the Residence Permit Directive and it clarifies that while the 
latter deals with third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking, the 
Trafficking Directive deals with “specific protective measures for any victim of 
trafficking in human beings” (Para 17). Article 1 of the Residence Permit 
Directive states that the aim of this Directive “is to define the conditions for 
granting residence permits of limited duration… to third-country nationals who 
cooperate” against trafficking and smuggling (Article 1 of Residence Permit 
Directive).  Article 3 (1) states that the provisions of this “Directive shall be 
applied to the third-country nationals who are, or who have been victims of 
offences related to the trafficking in human beings, even if they have illegally 
entered the territory of the Member State” (Directive 2004/81/EC).  
 The Trafficking Directive includes additional forms of sexual and labour 
exploitation which were outside the scope of Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA and which are “begging, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the exploitation of criminal activities, or the removal of organs” 
(Directive 2011/36/EU: Paragraph 1 and Article 2(3)). The Trafficking Directive 
complies fully with the requirements of the European Court of Human Right 
(Strasbourg Court from now on) which considers human trafficking a form of 
slavery prohibited by Article 4 ECHR (Case Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 
Application no. 25965/04, judgement of 7 January 2010, paragraphs 282 at 283.  
See Case Siliadin v. France, Application no. 73316/01, Para 112. Case Chowdury 
and others. V. Greece, Application No. 21884/15, 20/3/2017. For an in-depth 
analysis of trafficking as a form of slavery (Piotrowicz, 2012). The Trafficking 
Directive also complies with the Strasbourg Courts’ case-law which has 
recognised that State Parties have the positive obligation to protect victims of 
trafficking. The Strasbourg Court has been very strict on this point and has 
sanctioned Greece because they did not protect a victim of human trafficking as 
they did not undertake investigations on trafficking and did not prosecute 
criminals in a reasonable time (Case L. E. v. Greece, Application no. 71545/12, 
Judgement of 21 January 2016). The Trafficking Directive states that Member 
States shall impose appropriate penalties and shall use effective investigations 
instruments to ensure that perpetrators of trafficking are arrested and prosecuted 
(Directive 2011/36/EU: Articles 4 and 9(4)). The Directive requires that Member 
States impose jurisdiction over human trafficking when the crime “is committed 
in whole or in part within their territory; or the offender is one of their nationals” 
(Article 10 Para 1).  
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Member States can impose extraterritorial jurisdiction by informing the 
Commission when the crime has been committed against one of its national or 
against a person who has the habitual residence on their territory; when the 
offence is committed for the interests of a legal person established on its territory 
or the perpetrator has his or her habitual residence on its territory (Article 10 Para 
2). Extraterritorial jurisdiction cannot be subject to the condition that the act is a 
criminal offence in the place where it is committed and that the prosecution can 
be initiated following a statement made by the victim or the State of the place 
where the crime was committed (Articles 10 Para 3 (a) and (b)). The Directive 
pays particular attention to the protection of victims by imposing Member States 
not to criminalise victims and not to bind investigation and prosecution to the 
report of the victim (Articles 8 and 9 Para 1). There are specific Articles in the 
Trafficking Directive establishing the form of protection victims of human 
trafficking are entitled to and there is a particular attention given to children. 
Conversely, the Framework Decision had only one provision on the protection of 
victims as it prioritized the fight against trafficking rather than protection of 
victims (Council Framework Decision 2002: Article 7). The victim centered 
approach can also be found in other provisions of the Trafficking Directive which 
establish that victims shall receive assistance and support before, during and after 
the conclusion of criminal proceedings for an appropriate period of time 
(Directive 2011/36/EU: Article 11 Para 1).  
The Directive has a provision, very wide in scope, which supports the 
identification of victims. The provision states that victims shall be provided 
support as soon as ‘the competent authorities have a reasonable-grounds 
indication for believing that the person might have been subjected’ to human 
trafficking (Article 11 Para 2 Directive 2011/36/EU 5 April 2011. Article 12 Para 
1 of the Trafficking Directive states that provisions on the protection of victims 
of trafficking in criminal investigations, “shall apply to the rights set out in 
Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA” (Directive 2011/36/EU 5 April 2011). This 
Framework Decision provided protection of victims of crimes in criminal 
proceedings and has been replaced by Directive 2012/29/EU. By linking the legal 
framework on the protection of victims in general to victims of human 
trafficking, these provisions further highlight the importance of protecting 
victims and the importance of ensuring that they are not victimized again. This is 
because victims of human trafficking can be protected under the specific 
provisions established by the Residence Permit Directive or by the Trafficking 
Directive in connection with Directive 2012/29/EU on protection of victims of 
crime. Article 1 Para 1 of this latter Directive states that “The purpose of this 
Directive is to ensure that victims of crime receive appropriate information, 
support and protection and are able to participate in criminal proceedings”. 
Article 2 Para 1 (a) (i) states that ‘‘victim’ means a natural person who has 
suffered harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss 
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which was directly caused by a criminal offence”. Victims of human trafficking 
can fall into this category and receive the appropriate protection. 
It should be noted that the Human Trafficking Directive has provided a wide 
definition of trafficking, which includes slavery and other forms of exploitation. 
However, it has not provided adequate provisions for the identification and 
protection of victims of human trafficking. Article 11 Para 2 leaves wide 
discretion to the competent authorities of Member States by requiring them to 
give assistance and support to people on the basis of the ‘reasonable-ground 
indication’. If from one side, the ‘reasonable-grounds indication’ criteria can 
permit them to identify as many victims as possible at an early stage and 
identification is very important, in order to grant victims the residence permit and 
to prevent re-victimization (Craggs and Martens, 2010). This is because victims 
would not be left in detention centers with other migrants or deported 
unidentified. Indeed, if they are left in detention centers, they will be at high risk 
of re-victimization (Craggs and Martens, 2010: 56). From the other side, leaving 
wide discretion to Member States can lower the standard of protection of the 
Council of Europe Trafficking Convention (CoE Trafficking Convention) 
(Stoyanova, 2017: 448). This is because the Trafficking Directive does not 
establish a specific procedure that can permit the identification of victims and 
prevent their immediate deportation on the basis of the reasonable grounds to 
believe that they could be victims of trafficking rather than only irregular 
migrants that should be deported (Stoyanova, 2017: 449).    
What is the actual situation in the UK and how will Brexit impact on the 
identification and protection of trafficking’s victims? In order to answer these 
questions, the article will clarify the UK’s position towards the Human 
Trafficking Directive and other EU legal instruments which can support the fight 
against human trafficking. 
The UK’s Position Towards the Trafficking Directive  
At international level, the UK ratified the Council of Europe Convention on 
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (CoE Trafficking Convention) in 
2009 (Council of Europe, 2017). At EU level, the UK pre-Brexit had a particular 
position in the criminal area which, before the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, was incorporated in the third pillar of the EU Treaty.1  Under the Lisbon 
Treaty, the UK retained this right to opt out from the criminal area which was 
part of Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
entitled Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) for a transitional period of 
five years from the entry into force of the Treaty and the transitional period 
expired in 2014 (Article 10 Protocol 36. (Mitsilegas, 2017) The UK decided to 
                                                        
1 For an in depth analysis see Peers (2016: 41-44). 
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opt out from the new Title V and from the Schengen acquis and their position is 
regulated by Article 1 Para 1 of Protocol (No 21) and by Protocol 19 of the EU 
Treaty.  However, the UK also decided to opt in some measures concerning the 
criminal area2  and in between these measures there are Europol and Eurojust, 
Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) and the EAW.3                                                                           
In addition, the UK can request to participate in measures concerning the 
Schengen acquis and the Council will take the decision on the UK’s participation 
through unanimous votes (EU Treaty: Protocol (No 19), Article 4). The same 
principles apply to the participation in measures concerning Title V TFEU. The 
UK can request to the President of the Council to participate within three months, 
after a proposal or an initiative has been presented to the Council which, can 
allow the UK to opt in by unanimous votes (EU Treaty: Protocol (No 21), Article 
3 Paras 1 and 2). The UK can also notify the intention to accept a measure 
concerning Title V TFEU to the Council and the Commission, after the measure 
has been adopted (EU Treaty: Protocol (No 21), Article 4). In that case, in order 
to permit the UK to be bound by the measure, the provisions on enhanced co-
operation and indicated by Article 331 Para 1 TFEU will apply (Article 4).  
As far as the EU Trafficking Directive is concerned, the UK initially decided 
not to participate in its adoption. On that occasion, the Home Office sent a letter 
to the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee where they explained the 
decision not to opt in the proposed Trafficking Directive (Home Office Letter, 
2010).  The Home Office explained that their reasons were mainly related to the 
fact “The Directive will not make a significant practical difference to the way we 
combat trafficking and support victims” (Home Office: 2010). The Home Office 
added   
…there may be changes to the Directive as a result of the remaining 
negotiations with the European Parliament which could affect UK 
interests, such as expanding support provisions for those who have not yet 
                                                        
2  See List of Union acts adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in the field of 
police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters which cease to apply to the 
United Kingdom as from 1 December 2014 pursuant to Article 10(4), second sentence, of 
Protocol (No 36) on transitional provisions.  OJ C 430/17, 1/12/2014.  See List of Union acts 
adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in the field of police cooperation and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters which have been amended by an act applicable to the 
United Kingdom adopted after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and which therefore 
remain applicable to the United Kingdom as amended or replaced.  On OJ C 430/23, 1/12/2014. 
3 See Annex to Council Decision 2014/836/EU of 27 November 2014 determining certain 
consequential and transitional arrangements concerning the cessation of the participation of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in certain acts of the Union in the 
field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters adopted before the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.  On OJ L 343/11, 28/11/2014.   
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been identified as victims of trafficking, and expanding extra-territorial 
jurisdiction. (Home Office: 2010).   
By the wordings of this letter, it can be deducted that the UK had two main 
concerns on the early draft of the Trafficking Directive. One concern was about 
the issue of national sovereignty as expanding extra-territorial jurisdiction over 
the crime of human trafficking could permit investigative and judicial authorities 
of other Member States to interfere with criminal issues which are of national 
sovereignty and which could jeopardise the British national interests. This fact 
can be drawn by the strict UK’s position on national sovereignty shown when the 
European Commission proposed the establishment of the European Public 
Prosecution Office (The United Kingdom Parliament, Select Committee on 
European Communities, 1999). The second concern related to the identification 
of victims and this can be deducted by the letter itself where the government 
stated that they were reluctant to expand legal support to people who had not 
been identified as victims as yet. The UK’s priority has always been to control 
unlawful immigration and to maintain border security and they continue to be 
their priorities above protection of people from criminal networks and human 
trafficking, even after Brexit (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 
2017). 
In any case, in 2010, the Home Office decided to review their position after 
the Directive was finalised with the purpose to evaluate better whether it can 
strengthen the efforts against human trafficking whilst preserving the UK’s 
interests. In the meantime, the Trafficking Directive was adopted and stated that 
the UK was not taking part in the adoption of the Directive (Directive 
2011/36/EU: Para 35). After the adoption of the Directive, the UK notified to the 
Commission and to the Council their intention to accept the Trafficking 
Directive, on the basis of Article 4 Protocol (No 21) TFEU (Commission 
Decision 2011/169/EU of 14 October 2011, OJ L 271, 18 October 2012: 49). 
Therefore, all provisions related to co-operation in the fight against human 
trafficking and on the identification and protection of victims, apply to the UK.  
Following the acceptance of the Trafficking Directive, the UK adopted the 
Modern Slavery Act 2015. The Modern Slavery Act states that a person commits 
human trafficking if he or she facilitates the travel of another person with the aim 
to exploit the person (Modern Slavery Act, 2015 c. 30: s. 3). Subsequently, the 
Act states that a person is exploited if he or she is victim of slavery, servitude and 
forced or compulsory labour, sexual exploitation, removal of organs or if his or 
her services are secured by the use of force, threat or deception or if services are 
secured from children or other vulnerable persons. These sections of the Modern 
Slavery Act identify human trafficking as a form of slavery and this is required 
by the Trafficking Directive and by the Strasbourg Court’s case-law, as explained 
in section 2 of this article. There are then provisions about the identification of 
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victims which state that the Secretary of State may make regulations with the 
purpose to provide assistance and support to victims when ‘there are reasonable 
grounds to believe’ that the persons ‘may be victims of slavery or human 
trafficking’ (s. 50 Para 1 (a)). The ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ expression has 
been taken directly from the Trafficking Directive which leaves wide discretion 
to Member States’ competent authorities to evaluate whether a person could be 
considered a victim as defined within the context of the Trafficking Directive. In 
these cases, the Trafficking Directive and the Modern Slavery Act 2015 state 
both that the person must be provided protection and support.  However, as 
pointed out above, leaving too much discretion to States can cause 
misidentification because Member States can use their discretion in a narrow way 
to deport as many irregular migrants as possible without identifying victims of 
human trafficking in between migrants. 
The Modern Slavery Act 2015 states that a person who has been found guilty 
of slavery or human trafficking, shall be prevented from travelling abroad for a 
period of no longer than 5 years (Modern Slavery Act, 2015: s. 25). This 
provision requires that the UK takes responsibility for persons who have 
committed slavery or human trafficking on their territories and this is also the 
requirement of the Human Trafficking Directive which establishes that Member 
States must “take the necessary measures to establish their jurisdiction on human 
trafficking when the offender has committed the crime in part or wholly on their 
territories” (Directive 2011/36/EU: Article 10 Para 1). The Modern Slavery Act 
states that the offender shall be requested to surrender all the passports which 
have been confiscated to the defendants (s. 25 Para 4).  
The protection of identified victims of trafficking as required by the Modern 
Slavery Act, is actioned by the National Referral Mechanism (NRM).  The NRM 
was established in 2009 following the ratification of the CoE Trafficking 
Convention (National Criminal Agency, 2017a). In 2015, the NRM has been 
extended to all victims of slavery, following the implementation of Modern 
Slavery Act 2015 (National Criminal Agency, 2017a). The NRM has the task to 
collect data on victims of human trafficking and slavery.  For that purpose, the 
National Crime Agency (NCA) established the Modern Slavery Human 
Trafficking Unit (MSHTU) which coordinates the UK’s response to Human 
Trafficking and Modern Slavery domestically and internationally. (National 
Crime Agency, 2017b) The MSHTU support victims of human trafficking by 
identifying potential victims and by advising law enforcement authorities on how 
to gain their trust in order to obtain evidence against perpetrators of trafficking. 
(National Crime Agency, 2017c). Since 2015, efforts have been made by the 
British government in order to fight against human trafficking adequately and it 
is clear by reading the Modern Slavery Act and by the establishment of the NRM 
and MSHTU, that the UK have intention to focus on the protection of victims. 
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Victims have to be liberated by their perpetrators and have to be provided a 
shelter in order to be put in the position to decide whether they want to testify 
against their exploiters.  
However, the 2015 Modern Slavery Act has been assessed by an independent 
review which revealed that often victims are not identified because their status of 
potential victims is confused with their immigration status when they apply for 
asylum and this fact discourages them, from reporting their status because they 
fear deportation (Craig, 2017). Complainants have also reported that they have 
not been provided with protection available to them during and after the trial 
(Home Office, 2016: 3). Reports have also been made by the Independent Anti-
Slavery Commissioner who emphasised that the NRM should be radically 
improved to ensure that victims are identified and receive adequate support and 
this issue will be “at the centre of an improved process” (Independent Anti-
Slavery Commissioner Report, 2016).  
The training of police forces, investigators and prosecutors is discontinuous 
and sometimes absent (Home Office, 2016: 3). Finally, there is “Insufficient 
quality and quantity of intelligence about the extent of modern slavery at 
regional, national and international level” (Home Office, 2016: 3). The 
Independent Anti-Slavery Commission has pointed out that the Modern Slavery 
Act has to prioritize, among others, the identification of victims, the improvement 
of law enforcement and criminal justice and international collaboration.  
International collaboration is very important to detect criminal organizations 
perpetrating trafficking when this crime has a trans-national dimension. The 
Independent Anti-Slavery Commission has indicated international cooperation as 
a fifth priority (Independent Anti-Slavery Commissoner Report, 2017). The 
priority should be fulfilled by focusing on prevention, on enhanced European 
cooperation, by ensuring that modern slavery becomes part of the global agenda 
and by adopting protection measures in humanitarian responses. 
 Prevention of trafficking should be ensured by developing projects with 
countries of origin from where there is a high number of trafficked victims. The 
Independent Anti-Slavery Commission stated that this aim should be achieved 
by preventing human trafficking through cooperation between the Home Office, 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International 
Development, the National Crime Agency (NCA), the Crown Prosecution 
Service and other statutory agencies, NGOs and international partners. 
The Independent Anti-Slavery Commission highlighted that international 
collaboration should be strengthened by enhancing European collaboration. This 
is a very important aspect of international cooperation when the crime of human 
trafficking has a cross-border dimension. For this purpose, the UK should 
cooperate with the EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, the OCSE Special 
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Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, 
Europol and Eurojust. Particular attention is given to these two agencies to ensure 
an effective European response is given, when human trafficking has a cross-
border dimension. It is highlighted that UK police forces should work with 
Europol and Eurojust in order to encourage the use of Joint Investigation Teams 
when the crime has a cross-border dimension. The Independent Anti-Slavery 
Commission also highlighted the importance of data and intelligence sharing 
with Europol in the fight against human trafficking and slavery. 
In the next sections, the article will focus on issues concerning police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In particular, the article will focus on 
post-Brexit relationship between the UK and Europol and between the UK and 
Eurojust.  The consequences that Brexit may have on the execution of the EAW 
will also be analysed.  Subsequently, the article will focus on issues related to 
identification of victims and consequences that Brexit may have on victims and 
potential victims. 
International Cooperation in the Fight against Human Trafficking and 
Issues Related to A Surge in Victims After Brexit 
Europol which stands for European Police Agency is a European agency 
established to support and strengthen actions of Member States competent 
authorities and their mutual cooperation in preventing and fighting against 
organized crime (Article 3 Regulation (EU) 2016/794).   Eurojust was established 
to strengthen mutual cooperation between judicial authorities of Member States.  
The UK has supported the setting up of these two agencies and its departure from 
the EU could cause obstacles to investigations on crimes having a trans-national 
dimension, including human trafficking. (Article 3 of The Consolidated Version 
of the Eurojust Council Decision 2002/187/JHA on setting up Eurojust, as 
amended by Council Decision 2003/659/JHA, and Council Decision 
2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust, 
5347/3/09).  
Europol 
Brexit may make collaboration with Europol and Eurojust and the use of JITs 
very difficult to achieve if the UK by leaving the EU single market, will also 
leave Europol and Eurojust and important instruments such as the EAW which 
could strengthen the fight against slavery and trafficking when they have a 
transnational dimension. After the referendum, the British government published 
the Great Repeal Bill by which the existing EU law will be converted into British 
law and then, the Parliament will decide which of EU law will be amended, kept 
and repealed (Department for Exiting the European Union. 2017a: Para. 1.12).  
Following, the publication of the Bill, the EU Select Committee of the House of 
Lords focussed on future relationship between the UK and the EU on co-
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operation against crimes with a trans-national dimension. The future cooperation 
with Europol and Eurojust were discussed as the execution of the EAW. These 
issues are very important as trafficking in human beings can have a trans-national 
dimension and the Independent Anti-Slavery Commission has stressed that 
collaboration with Europe is very important to detect this crime. 
 The UK has a very difficult position at the moment because they have used 
agencies such as Europol more than other EU countries (HM Government, 2016: 
Para 1.16). The UK has already confirmed that they will opt in the new 
Regulation which reformed Europol (Regulation 2016/794, 11 May 2016 and 
Letter from Brandon Lewis MP, 2016). However, leaving the EU will make the 
situation very problematic because the UK, by leaving the EU, will leave all EU 
measures adopted when they were a member of the EU. The NCA has stated that 
retaining the Europol’s membership or exploring other options are the most 
important priorities in between all the measures in the AFSJ (House of Lords, 
European Union Committee, 2016). However, in the European Committee of the 
House of Lords, it was underlined that an agreement as third country with 
Europol would be quite problematic because these agreements are very difficult 
to achieve as they are “lengthy” and “measured in years and not months” (House 
of Lords, European Union Committee, 2016: Para. 52). It could take between five 
to seven years to conclude a new agreement between the UK and the EU on future 
Europol’s relationship (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2016: Para. 
58). It must be added that even if an agreement between the EU and the UK is 
achieved, the UK would become an operational co-operation partner. This new 
position means that they UK will not be on the management board and thus, they 
will not have any influential position within the Europol (House of Lords, 
European Union Committee, 2016: Para 54). According to NCA, these 
agreements would not be sufficient to address the UK’s issues (House of Lords, 
European Union Committee, 2016: Para 56). The UK would lose access to the 
Europol Information System which gathers information on suspected and 
convicted criminals and on suspected terrorists from all EU Member States (Para. 
56). In this way, all enquiries on suspected criminals would take longer to be 
gathered because the NCA would not have direct access to the information any 
more (Para. 56). It was highlighted that leaving the Europol could mean not to be 
accountable anymore to the CJEU’s jurisdiction (House of Lords, European 
Union Committee, 2016: Para 62). This may be welcomed by many British 
people. However, the Committee emphasised that lack of CJEU’s jurisdiction 
could have a negative impact on any agreement with the EU on participation in 
Europol’s activities because Europol is accountable before the European 
Commission, the CJEU and the European Parliament. Therefore, Lord Kirkhope 
questioned whether the EU would accept an agreement with the UK which 
excludes the accountability of Europol before the CJEU and other EU institutions 
(Para 62).  Finally, it was pointed out that any future agreements with Europol 
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should be concluded only if the UK meets the data protection standards required 
by the EU (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2016, Para 63). There 
is uncertainty on the Europol’s scope in a post-Brexit Europe and this issue may 
complicate cooperation with the EU-27 in the fight against slavery and human 
trafficking which is already problematic as stated by the Independent Anti-
Slavery Commission. 
Eurojust 
Another EU agency Brexit will impact on is Eurojust which supports and 
coordinates national investigating and prosecuting authorities on serious crimes 
perpetrated in two or more EU Member States (Article 3 of The Consolidated 
Version of the Eurojust Council Decision 2002/187/JHA on setting up Eurojust, 
as amended by Council Decision 2003/659/JHA, and Council Decision 
2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust, 
5347/3/09). Support and coordination can include the facilitation of mutual legal 
assistance, the execution of the EAW and the establishment of JITs teams set up 
by Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA. The UK opted in the JITs in 
2014 (Commission Decision 2014/858/EU of 1 December 2014) Eurojust can be 
a significant support in investigations concerning human trafficking when the 
crime is committed in different EU Member States. The Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) emphasised that they are habitual users of Eurojust “listing it 
among their top priorities for any forthcoming negotiation on Brexit” (House of 
Lords, European Union Committee, 2016: Para 74). The Director of Public 
Prosecutions pointed out that the Eurojust’s features facilitate investigations 
because their work is undertaken multilaterally rather than bilaterally. In this 
way, it is possible to evaluate who has the evidence and who has to work together 
and whether it is necessary to have JITs. In addition, the Director stated that 
Eurojust being a neutral agency, permits immediate flexibility and the 
opportunity to communicate with many Member States at the same time rather 
than bilaterally. Leaving Eurojust could mean losing the influential position on 
decisions affecting this agency (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 
2016: Para 77). 
 The British Government is exploring the possibility of concluding an 
agreement with Eurojust similar to those agreements put in place with Norway, 
Switzerland and the US (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2016: 
Para 78). These nations post Liaison Prosecutors to Eurojust without being part 
of this EU agency. However, bilateral agreements could be difficult to achieve as 
Eurojust will be accountable to EU institutions such as the CJEU. The UK has 
clearly stated that they do not want to continue to be bound by the CJEU (House 
of Lords, European Union Committee, 2016: Para 32). This decision could create 
a political obstacle to future agreements in the criminal area (House of Lords, 
European Union Committee, 2016: Paras 78 and 83).  
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 The European Arrest Warrant 
Accountability before EU institutions such as the CJEU is an issue for dealing 
with Eurojust and Europol but also for the execution of the EAW. Maintaining 
the EAW is very important because it facilitates extradition of criminals between 
EU Member States to face prosecution and it facilitates the implementation of 
prison sentences for existing convictions. The British government in a recent 
White Paper, asserted that they want to bring an end to the CJEU’s jurisdiction. 
(Department for Exiting the European Union, 2017b: Para 2.3). However, the 
British government has intention to retain the EAW after Brexit as “it is a priority 
for [the Government] to ensure that we remain part of the arrangement”’(House 
of Lords, European Union Committee, 2017: Para 2). The problem emphasised 
by the European Union Committee of the House of Lords is that retaining the 
EAW can be very difficult because even if the 27 EU Member States (EU-27) 
and the UK reach an international agreement on the EAW, all international 
agreements on future arrangements between the UK and the EU-27 are subject 
to the CJEU’s interpretation because the CJEU has the role to interpret the 
Treaties that the EU signs with third countries (House of Lords, European Union 
Committee, 2016: Para 32). Hence, it is very difficult to continue to be part of 
the EAW without accepting the CJEU’s jurisdiction.  
The UK has already accepted that existing CJEU’s case-law will not be 
disputed after Brexit (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2017: Para 
40). However, the UK has intention not to recognise case-law after Brexit and 
this decision of the Government could be difficult to achieve because, as the 
European Union Select Committee has emphasised, the CJEU’s post-Brexit case-
law, could still have authority in Britain because it could be an essential 
requirement for any future agreements between the EU-27 and the UK on 
extradition. However, the British government is not persuaded that this should be 
the direction to follow as they prefer to replace the CJEU’s jurisdiction with an 
arbitration mechanism such as EFTA (House of Lords, European Union 
Committee, 2017: Para 41); However,  this idea does not appear to be a solution 
as the EFTA Court has only jurisdiction for infringement actions in the single 
market’s area against the EFTA Countries which are Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2017: Para Box 2 and 
Para 34). The EFTA system does not apply to JHA and any dispute related to the 
criminal area (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2017: Para 34). The 
UK government has also explored the possibility of other options rather than the 
EAW.  One of these options is to substitute the EAW with the 1957 Council of 
Europe Convention on extradition (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 
2017, Para 55). Sir Francis Jacobs pointed out that the 1957 Council of Europe 
Convention is not an adequate replacement of the EAW and in order to apply the 
extradition as established by the Convention, it would be necessary to update 
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arrangements for surrenders otherwise when the UK will leave the EU “there will 
be a cliff-edge” (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2017: Para 57). 
In other words, there is the risk that the UK and the EU-27 will not find any 
agreements on the EAW.  If this is the case, it is predicted that the UK will have 
to amend the Extradition Act 2003 and reconsider EU Member States not as 
category 1 States where the EAW applies but as category 2 and this means that 
ordinary extradition regime will apply on cooperation between the EU-27 and the 
UK and no longer the EAW (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2017: 
Para 58). There is the risk that the UK will have to make arrangements for 
extradition request with each Member State if there are not pre-existing 
arrangements with EU Member States (House of Lords, European Union 
Committee, 2017: Para 59). It must also be pointed out that the EAW overcame 
bureaucratic problems which slowed the extradition procedures, by applying the 
principle of mutual recognition. The traditional extradition procedure would pose 
the same problems again.  In other terms, there would be “A return to a political, 
rather than a judicial approach to extradition” (House of Lords, European Union 
Committee, 2017: Para 60) because the 1957 Extradition Convention would shift 
responsibility to diplomatic channels. Instead, the EAW transferred the 
responsibility to courts and they can only authorize extradition (Para 60).  In this 
way, delays can be avoided where by the extradition procedure; they will be 
unavoidable as they will be caused by the involvement of diplomatic channels. 
Finally, the EU-27 may rule out the issue of extradition orders whether there is 
the risk that data protection standards between them and the UK may diverge and 
against their nationals outside the scope of the EAW and outside the concept of 
EU citizenship on which the EAW is based (House of Lords, European Union 
Committee, 2017: Paras 67 at 68).  
The British government is aware of all these difficulties and thus, it explored 
the alternative to negotiate a bilateral agreement similar to the one concluded by 
Iceland and Norway with the EU (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 
2017: Para 70).  From one side, it has been pointed out that these agreements 
have been concluded with two States which are preparing to join the EU and that 
are part of the Schengen Area (Para 70). From the other side, it has been argued 
that the agreement contains dispute resolution mechanism and thus, it is worthy 
to be taken into account as the British government plans to leave the CJEU’s 
jurisdiction (Para 70). In any case, the European Union Committee concluded 
that it would be better not to leave the CJEU’s jurisdiction and to continue to rely 
on the EAW (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2017: Para 71). The 
reason is mainly because the 1957 Council of Europe Convention on Extradition 
would slow down the extradition procedure. (House of Lords, European Union 
Committee, 2017: Para 73). There is also the risk of a ‘cliff-edge’ after the 
deadline to negotiate an agreement with the EU which is March 2019 (House of 
Lords, European Union Committee, 2017: Paras 71 and 72). A ‘cliff-edge may 
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have a negative impact on the fight against human trafficking. If from one side, 
the British government has shown a willingness to co-operate with EU-27 in the 
fight against cross-border crime. The accountability before the CJEU can be 
challenging as it can cause obstacle in co-operation in criminal matters. Most 
recently the UK has confirmed their commitment to co-operation with the EU in 
criminal matters but recent developments have not clarified how their position to 
leave the CJEU’s jurisdiction can be reconciled with their wish to continue to co-
operate with EU 27 in the fight against crime. (HM Government, 2017a). These 
issues can aggravate investigations on human trafficking as uncertainty will not 
contribute to improve co-operation in between law enforcement authorities in 
detecting criminals and identifying victims. This uncertainty also characterises 
the position of EU citizens in the UK after the UK’s departure from the EU. 
Identification of Victims and the Consequences of Brexit 
The UK’s departure from the EU can affect the identification of victims. 
Identification of victims and potential victims is essential in the fight against 
human trafficking. At the European level, the CoE Trafficking Convention states 
that States Parties “shall provide… a recovery and reflection period of at least 30 
days, when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person concerned is 
a victim” (Council of Europe, 2005: Article 13 (1)). As shown in section 3 of this 
article, the Anti-Slavery Commission has stressed the importance of identifying 
and protecting victims of human trafficking. The NRM has five days from when 
a person has been referred for protection, to decide whether there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person is a potential victim of human trafficking and 
slavery (National Referral Mechanism, 2017). Subsequently, the person has 45 
days of reflection and recovery period during which, the Competent Authority 
decides whether the person is a victim or no. The 45 days comply with the 
requirements of the CoE Trafficking Convention.  Therefore, even after Brexit, 
the minimum requirements of 45 days will be kept in place. Certainly, the Human 
Trafficking Foundation has reported that 45 days are not sufficient to recover 
victims as they are still very vulnerable after this short period of time. (Human 
Trafficking Foundation, 2016).  However, even if reforms are desirable, after 
Brexit, the UK cannot grant a recovery period shorter than 30 days. 
This seems to be the only positive aspect concerning the future fight against 
human trafficking and modern slavery. This is because after Brexit, the status of 
EU citizens will change and their new status will create a situation of uncertainty 
among EU citizens and their risk to be exploited and enslaved will increase 
(FLEX-LEAG, 2017). In June 2017, the British government published a proposal 
on the position of EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals living in the EU. In 
the proposal, the government clearly stated that after Brexit, the UK law will 
create new rights for EU citizens residing in the UK before the exit from the EU 
(HM Government, 2017b: 4). The government explained that after the UK 
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departure from the EU, EU law will become international law and that the CJEU 
will not have jurisdiction within the UK legal system any more. In the proposal, 
the government highlighted that EU citizens already residing in the UK will be 
granted indefinite leave to remain (settled status) as established by the 
Immigration Act 1971. All EU citizens and their families who have been resident 
in the UK for five years before a specified date will acquire settled status. EU 
citizens and their dependant families who have resided in the UK less than five 
years before a specified date, will have to complete a continuous period of 5 years 
to acquire settled status. The specified date will not be earlier than 29 March 
2017, date when Article 50 EU Treaty was triggered by the UK government to 
initiate the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, and no later than the date the UK 
formally withdraws from the EU (HM Government, 2017b: 5).  
EU citizens who arrive after the specified date will be recognised the right to 
remain in the UK for a temporary period and will be granted settled status on a 
case by case basis, even though “this group should have no expectation of 
guaranteed settled status” (HM Government, 2017b: 4). This proposal is 
temporary, but it is clear that after a certain date EU citizens arriving after Brexit 
in the UK will have the same immigration status of third country nationals 
arriving in the UK. EU citizens will no longer be able to travel to the UK and 
apply for jobs free from immigration controls; and if they do not comply with 
UK immigration law, they will be subject to immigration restrictions, including 
being returned to their countries of origin. There is, thus, the risk that the new 
legal status will increase human trafficking. The Labour Exploitation Advisory 
Group (LEAG) reported that the uncertainty experienced by EU citizens after the 
Brexit Referendum, is causing vulnerability (2017: 4). The focus on immigration 
restrictions is feared very much by EU citizens as they think that barriers to enter 
the UK and work will see a surge in the number of undocumented workers 
“creating a hidden workforce who are much more vulnerable due to lack of 
status” (FLEX-LEAG, 2017: 6).  It has also been reported by LEAG members 
that EU workers are already experiencing exploitation.  This is because EU 
citizens have to demonstrate to have exercised Treaty rights in order to obtain 
permanent residence certificates. Therefore, they are accepting any kind of work 
including exploitative work to demonstrate their status (FLEX-LEAG, 2017). 
Reduction of legal routes and other immigration restrictions will mean that 
traffickers will bring to the UK more undocumented migrants for the purpose of 
exploitation. Migrants will have no choice other than accepting exploitation, as 
they will be under the traffickers’ threat to be arrested, imprisoned and deported. 
Prioritizing immigration control, may lead to criminalise victims of exploitation. 
LEAG members emphasised that restrictive immigration policies will cause an 
increase of human trafficking and labour exploitation (FLEX-LEAG, 2017: 8). 
Therefore, there will be the need to strengthen training for border control, labour 
market enforcement and of officials from the Home Office, in order to ensure 
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that EU nationals, who become victims of human trafficking and labour 
exploitation are identified and supported rather than criminalised, detained and 
deported after the UK’s departure from the EU. 
Conclusions 
This article has shown that there is uncertainty in the way trafficking in human 
beings will be tackled by the UK when they will leave the EU. The article has 
shown uncertainty by focusing on the consequences that Brexit can have in the 
fight against human trafficking in co-operation with the EU-27 when the crime 
has a trans-national dimension. The UK is very keen to continue police and 
judicial co-operation with the EU-27 but since they want to leave the CJEU’s 
jurisdiction, there can be issues related to the accountability of EU agencies such 
as Europol and Eurojust as they are subject to the control of European institution. 
Another problem which has been risen by the article is the application of the 
EAW. The UK has relied on the EAW very often but leaving the EU may mean 
having to return to the use of diplomatic channels rather than legal channels in 
order to be able to arrest a suspected criminal. The EAW is based on mutual 
judicial cooperation and mutual trust between EU Member States and these 
principles might be jeopardised by the UK leaving the EU. 
On top of this situation there is the uncertainty which characterises the free 
movement of persons. The UK aim to impose immigration controls and 
restrictions on new EU citizens moving to the UK. In the future, new EU entrants 
may become irregular migrants and this fact can make them vulnerable and easy 
targets for human traffickers. Criminal organisations target vulnerable 
individuals.  EU citizens would become vulnerable individuals if subjected to 
immigration controls.  They may risk living in hiding in the UK. Criminal 
organisations may take an advantage of this situation by threatening to report 
them to the authorities. EU citizens may accept to become victims of human 
trafficking to prevent criminal organisations report them. This situation may 
contribute to increase the number of human trafficking victims’. These problems 
are not being addressed in the negotiations as the priority seems to be to impose 
more immigration controls after the UK will leave the EU. 
It can be concluded that if from one side, it is desirable that the EU and the 
UK find an agreement because they both benefit from EU police and judicial co-
operation. (Carrapico et al, 2017) From the other side, the UK will not be able to 
exercise any influential position anymore by staying out from the EU, by not 
accepting the CJEU’s jurisdiction and by imposing immigration controls over EU 
citizens. Some scholars are arguing that the fact that the UK has always taken 
initiatives and provided expertise in the area of internal security, may mean that 
“Brexit has the potential to disrupt internal security processes at different levels” 
(Carrapico et al, 2017: 24-25). Certainly there is this risk. However, it is greater 
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for the UK than the EU because Brexit represents an opportunity for the EU 
which can strengthen “harmonization of norms and deeper integration without 
having to cope with the operation of two or more parallel systems” (Carrapico et 
al, 2017: 24). The problem is heavier for EU citizens who will move to the UK 
after Brexit as they will not benefit from the status of EU citizens living in a EU 
country any more. This situation can be detrimental for the fight against human 
trafficking as victims and potential victims could increase. This problem should 
be seriously focused by the EU and the UK which should prioritize people and 
their protection from human trafficking and slavery to any trade agreement. It is 
hoped that they will prioritize citizens and that the UK will not be left without 
agreement at the end of the two years mainly because this will have negative 
consequences for human beings. 
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